This paper advocates explicitness about the type of entity to be considered as contentbearing in connectionist systems; it makes a positive proposal about how vehicles of content should be individuated; and it deploys that proposal to argue in favour of
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Clusters as Vehicles of Content 
Conclusion
An unnoticed misconception has had a pernicious effect in debates about connectionism. A tacit assumption has been at work about the entities to which content should be ascribed in connectionist systems. Lack of clarity about what they are taking the content-bearing entities to be is found on both sides of the ongoing debate about whether connectionist systems process internal representations. That battle, engaged most prominently between Jerry Fodor and Paul Churchland, can only be adjudicated relative to a specification of the vehicles to which putative contents are to be ascribed. Moreover, the assumption standardly made by connectionists, usually tacitly, about the individuation of vehicles of content serves to undermine their case for connectionist representation.
This paper advocates explicitness about the type of entity to be considered as content-bearing in connectionist systems; it makes a positive proposal about how vehicles of content should be individuated; and it deploys that proposal to argue in favour of representation in connectionist systems. To preview, the vehicles are clusters in the state space of a hidden layer; and attributing content to such vehicles is required for one kind of explanation of the behaviour of some networks.
The paper is in seven sections. Section (1) brings to light some standard assumptions about the vehicles of content in connectionist systems and suggests how they can be relaxed. Section (2) proposes that clusters are the vehicles of content, and section (3) deploys clusters in a content-based explanation of how some networks manage to generalise their trained correct performance to new samples. Section (4) interprets Laakso & Cottrell's exciting empirical results about similarities between connectionist networks in the light of this proposal. Section (5) examines whether Fodor & Lepore's criticisms of state space semantics apply to the new approach. Section (6) mentions some further virtues of treating the vehicles of content in connectionist systems in this way, and section (7) lists some possible refinements.
Standard Assumptions About Connectionist Representations
This paper is part of a larger project, which is to assess whether connectionist systems process internal representations. Can and should their operation be explained by attributing representational content to their internal states? My contribution is to formulate a clear proposal about the vehicles of content. 1 For the sake of clarity, the current paper considers only multi-layer feedforward classifier networks trained by supervised learning using a delta rule. 2 Section 7 below suggests how the proposal can be generalised.
The cognitive revolution rehabilitated internal representations. However, with the package came rejection of behaviourism's associative learning mechanisms and a requirement that representations combine compositionally. Connectionists who seek to explain their systems representationally need only subscribe to the first article of the canon. They aim to posit internal representations, but ones which are acquired by 1 I remain neutral about whether such contents qualify as 'meanings' in any sense.
2 Usher (2001) which uses probabilistic classification networks to analyse content, but in a different way: to get at the statistical relations which are relied on in the informational theory of content offered there. The treatment does not concern the contents found within hidden layers of classificatory networks.
associationist learning and which need not have compositional structure. Connectionists can still join the cognitivists in going beyond instrumentalism about representation − if they can show that their systems too process real internal vehicles of content. 3 Thus,
representationalism requires, at a minimum, that a contentful explanation of the behaviour of a connectionist network be underpinned by a mechanism in the system which operates over representational vehicles to which those contents are ascribed.
Some may object to calling this 'representation', since it is sometimes required of representations that they enter into compositional structures, but the terminology is deliberate, since to assume that representations must be compositional is to beg an important question against the connectionist. The entities that vindicate the cognitive revolution's first and defining commitment − to an internal mechanism involving vehicles of content which are individuable non-semantically − deserve to be called representations.
Typing representations as vehicles of content groups together different internal entities
into classes that are importantly alike for internal processing, such they are all to be ascribed the same content: they are different realisations of the same vehicle of content. 4 In a network that employs parallel distributed processing, each representation will be some pattern of activation distributed across a layer of the network. It is tempting to move from this truism to the tacit assumption that each pattern of distributed activation is a different representation, and thus that each can have a (slightly) different content.
3
There may be some organisms and systems that are only representers in the instrumental sense − they are interpretable from the intentional stance (Dennett 1987) , though not in virtue of processing real internal representations. The issue here is whether a commitment to real internal representations, with its added explanatory purchase, can be defended for some connectionist systems.
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As I use the terms here, representations are concrete particulars (with contents, in addition to non-semantic properties); and vehicles of content are also representations, but individuated in a particular way: according to the non-semantic properties which group different tokens together as being of the same representation type for the purpose of assigning content to them. The usage is the same with written language: the word 'John' is the vehicle of the content John, but the word is a type − a (non-semantic) typing of marks on the page, of which the following are tokens: John, John, JOHN. If a representation is picked out semantically (eg, my current singular thought about my brother), then this also picks out a concrete particular − a representation − but not as a vehicle of content.
However, that is to deny that a network's states can be grouped together into vehicles of content at all. We should not foreclose the possibility of specifying vehicle types that abstract away from details of their realisation. After all, vehicle types in a classical computer are multiply realised in the implementing mechanism, rather in the way that the ink marks 'dog', 'Dog' and 'DOG' are different physical realisations of the same word type.
In searching for a non-semantic representation typing for connectionist systems, we should be open to the possibility that different patterns of distributed activation are of the same vehicle type.
The same point can be put in the language of state space. A state space is a useful way to think about patterns of activation across a layer of a network. State space is a notional high-dimensional space whose axes are constituted by the activation of nodes of the layer, so that any pattern of distributed activation corresponds to a point in the space.
The standard assumption is that each point in state space is a different representational vehicle with a slightly different content. That is a mistake. A successful representational account of connectionist systems is likely to group the points of state space into vehicle types, such that different points are of the same vehicle type. At least, in searching for a non-semantic representation typing we should allow for that possibility. We should reject the standard tacit commitment, which implicitly excludes it, that vehicle types are maximally fine-grained, each point in state space being a different representational vehicle with the potential to have a unique content.
A second standard assumption is to take each individual node in a layer as representing something separately, so that the nodes which are active in a given distributed pattern of activation make individual (proportional) contributions to the content of the distributed representation. For example:
'Mental representations are taken to consist of "subsymbols" associated with each node, while "whole" representations are real-valued vectors in a high-dimensional property space.' (Eliasmith 2003, p. 2, italics added.) 'The activation of a given unit (in a given context) thus signals a semantic fact: but it may be a fact that defies easy description using the words and phrases of daily language.' (Clark 2001, p. 67, italics added.) The nodes are thought to represent complex, inexpressible 'microfeatures' of the presented stimuli. For example, Cottrell thinks that each node in one of his trained face recognition networks represents a 'holon': some complex property of human faces, which can often be visualised as a ghostly, face-like shadow. 5 This idea is both supported by, and lends support to, the foregoing assumption of maximally fine-grained vehicle individuation.
The two assumptions together underwrite what I will call the microfeatural approach. The microfeatural approach encourages the view that, if connectionist systems represent, they do so in a way which is highly complex, with contents quite unlike those in everyday explanations. Their contents may even be ineffable. From here it is only a short step, via viewing connectionist networks as some kind of model of human brains, to eliminativism about the contents ascribed in everyday psychological explanations, 6 which some are happy to embrace.
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Yet there is no reason why the semantically relevant dimensions of a hidden layer state space should correspond to the activations of single nodes. The semantic dimensions may be independent of the axes defined by individual nodes. Thus, relaxing this second standard assumption opens up the possibility that hidden layers with different numbers of nodes could have the same number of semantic dimensions.
Finally, the microfeatural approach encourages the idea that hidden layer nodes represent even before training. After all, even when the network is assigned random or arbitrary weights, each node is differentially responsive to some complex, unspecifiable property of possible stimuli. However, the most exciting quality of connectionist models is their ability to develop entirely new representational resources. At best, they may give us an insight into how neural systems can develop from an untrained state which does not 7 represent to a trained one which does. The microfeatural approach is apt to stifle that hope from the outset. We should reject it, and allow that it may be that vehicles of content only arise at all as a result of development, so that an untrained network may be incapable of representation. 
Clusters as Vehicles of Content
When a network is trained, the final values of connection weights between its nodes are exquisitely sensitive to the starting weights (which are often assigned randomly) and the order of presentation of training samples. It seems dizzyingly difficult to compare the different weight matrices which result. And there is no obvious way of comparing trained networks with different architectures, since their weight matrices have different dimensions. The microfeatural approach entrenches the view that these different matrices encode different solutions to the training task, which may be practically incommensurable.
When that approach is rejected, the possibility arises that the mechanism of operation of a network can be described in a way which abstracts away from individual weight matrices and particular patterns of activation, such that it is shared by different networks trained on the same task. Such a description of a network's mechanism of operation would treat different patterns of activation as realisations of the same inner state, and so would be a good candidate for typing of vehicles of content.
It is striking that trained networks often manage to generalise: they can project their correct performance to samples not encountered during training. How so? An optimistic hope is that there is a representational explanation of this ability. This gives us a wish-list to guide our search for vehicles of content:
Desiderata − typing the vehicles of content in a connectionist system should:-(i) capture some underlying property of the network's mechanism of operation by which it performs its task;
(ii) abstract away from individual weight matrices and particular patterns of activation;
(iii) be such that it may be shared by different networks trained on the same task; and (iv) form part of an explanation of the network's ability to project its correct performance to new samples outside the training set.
Fodor claims that there is no way of describing a connectionist network that separates points in state space into different types:
'The "smallest" unit of connectionist representation for which a type/token relation is definable is a whole network.' (Fodor 2000, p. 50)
The present paper takes Fodor's objection as a challenge − it aims to show that there is such a typing (and that it meets the foregoing desiderata for vehicles of content).
Fortunately, modelling work already has a resource which can be modified and redeployed to meet the desiderata − cluster analysis. Cluster analysis is a family of techniques for mapping the distribution of activation points in state space. In one version a dendogram is constructed which pairs each activation point with its nearest neighbour, then pairs these pairs with nearest pairs, and so on, producing a hierarchical tree.
Dendograms show that in trained networks similar samples often produce similar patterns of activation in the hidden layer. An example is Sejnowski & Rosenberg's (1987) The tools of cluster analysis can be understood as probing a network's representational structure − the modellers just don't realise that they are uncovering their systems' vehicles of content. the important point is that a measure of proximity that is relative to the dimensions of a particular state space is sufficient to allow points to be grouped together based on such proximity.
FIGURE 1. Clusters in a state space with two hidden layer nodes
My claim is that these clusters or regions in state space are vehicles of content. The system's internal mechanism can be described in terms of operations on these vehicles thus: a presented sample activates a hidden layer cluster, which in turn activates an output layer cluster. We will see in the next section how and why contents should be ascribed to such clusters.
Notice that different networks can have type-identical clusters − a cluster in the state a particular cluster in network B. Indeed, clustering properties are independent of the number of hidden layer nodes, 12 so that state spaces with different numbers of axes may contain the same clusters. Thus, clustering properties can be shared by networks with different weight matrices and architectures. Networks might share some but not all clustering properties − a cluster in network A might correspond to another in network B activated by just the same samples without there being a correspondence between the other clusters in the two networks. So sharing some clusters does not guarantee that the networks will have the same overall set of vehicles of content.
Are clusters causally efficacious? The worry is that the activation of a cluster is always realised by the activation of a particular pattern of distributed activation. A complete description of the operation of a network can be given at this lower level, in terms of connection weights and individual patterns of activation. This worry is, in fact, just a particular guise of the standard problem of the causal efficacy of the properties found in the special sciences. It arises for vehicles of content in a classical computer, too, since classical syntax is also realised by lower-level processes. The syntax of a high level programming language is realised by the syntax of lower-level languages, sometimes proceeding via a series of levels until primitive computations are arrived at which can be implemented in physical components like transistors (whose operation is explained by molecular properties of the semiconducting crystals which realise those components).
Indeed, it should arise for any adequate typing of vehicles of content in any computational system, since the vehicle types should generalise over some class of lower level causal / mechanistic entities. It is an important metaphysical question whether any such special science property is causal − perhaps overdetermination can be dealt with and causation
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Throughout I use 'samples' for the real world entities, like colour chips, that are coded into inputs on which the networks are trained. Thus, the same sample will be encoded into different input vectors for the training of different networks. Points in a cluster are compared via samples, not input vectors.
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Subject to the constraint that the number of independent dimensions in cluster space obviously cannot exceed the number of nodes in a layer.
exists at multiple levels, perhaps they merely cause in virtue of being realised, etc. − but the causal efficacy of connectionist clusters is not a special case. For present purposes it is enough that clusters are just as explanatory, or as causal-explanatory, as the properties of chemistry, electronics or biology; indeed, they have the same metaphysical status as vehicles of content in classical computers. Most notably, these metaphysical questions arise for mental properties in general, when considered naturalistically. It might even be thought a merit of my proposed vehicles of content that, on this issue at least, they have the same metaphysical status as mental properties.
Where modellers have only tacitly subscribed to the microfeatural approach, it is easy to reconceive their explanations in terms of clusters. By contrast, Andy Clark has been much more careful, and he explicitly endorses the microfeatural approach to understanding static networks (1993, 1996; and 2001 quoted above) . Even so, when it comes to dynamic connectionist networks, Clark abandons the microfeatural idea, which is hard to make any sense of in the dynamic context. Instead, he allows that dynamic analysis of a network − finding attractor basins or principal component processes that account for its behaviour over time − might be uncovering temporally extended physical processes that are the vehicles of representational content in such systems (Clark 2001, p. 135) . The complexity of the dynamic case pushes Clark away from seeing such systems in terms of microfeatures.
I would argue that the basic unworkability of the microfeatural idea is just as good a reason for abandoning it for static networks. If basins of attraction for dynamic processes are the vehicles of content in dynamic networks, that strongly suggests that their analogue, clusters, are the vehicles of content in static networks.
Contentful Explanation
So we have seen that a trained network's mechanism of operation can often be described in terms of clusters. Are these vehicles of content? The acid test is whether content should be ascribed to the clusters. I will argue that it should if clusters are to be invoked, as is common empirical practice, in an explanation of a network's ability to generalise its correct performance to new samples; thus that clusters are vehicles of content to the extent that they form the basis of generalisation. Describing the mechanism in terms of clusters can show why the network behaves as it does with new inputs. Considered as individual patterns of activation, the new inputs are not the same as anything that the network has encountered during training (worse, a new sample will generally not be linearly separable, in input layer state space, from points representing training samples mapped to entirely different output classifications). But from the point of view of clusters, the new samples produce activation in the same hidden layer clusters as samples in the training set. When the network is described as transforming samples into hidden layer clusters and onwards into output layer clusters, then it is apparent that the new samples are being treated in the same way as some of the samples in the training set.
Thus, characterising the operation of the network in terms of clusters allows us to see it as carrying out the same operations on new samples as it did on samples in the training set, leading to correct classification of those new samples. This is unlikely to be a matter of chance, so we are driven to look for an explanation: something in virtue of which the same operations continue to produce correct results in response to new samples. That is to say, the empirically-observed phenomenon I am relying on cries out for the following kind 13 (1988) , Hinton (1989) , Elman (1991) , Dawson & Piercey (2001) .
14 Churchland & Sejnowski (1992) , p. 169.
15 Clark (1993 ), pp. 132-135, Elman (1991 .
of explanation: the new samples have some property in virtue of which they fall into existing hidden layer clusters, and so cause the network to produce correct responses at the output layer.
That kind of explanation cannot just advert to patterns of activation at the input layer, since new samples differ in their input encodings from anything in the training set.
So it is obliged to advert to properties of the samples themselves. The explanation is that the network is able to keep track of some property that is common between a new sample and some of the samples in training set, and that is relevant to the output classification. It does so by means of hidden layer clusters. That is to say, by activating an existing hidden layer cluster the network represents that the new sample has the property common to the training samples in the cluster. This correct intermediate classification is part of the process by which the network makes a correct output classification. Conversely, if a new sample fails to activate an existing hidden layer cluster, or if it activates a cluster of training samples with which it does not share a relevant property, the network will usually fail to make the correct output classification. In that case, misrepresentation at the hidden layer helps account for misrepresentation at the output layer. 16 So, are modellers right to point to hidden layer clusters to explain how a network manages correctly to classify a novel sample? Yes, provided their explanation is understood as attributing content to those clusters.
In short, the ability to project to new samples is explained by the fact that hidden layer clusters represent properties of the samples which are relevant to the output Of course, correct classification at the hidden layer does not necessitate correct performance at the output layer, it just makes it much more likely; so the explanation offered here is abductive and defeasible.
about the network's developmental history, but on facts about its internal structure and the dispositions of those structures in relation to features of the network's environment.
The explanation points to an intermediate processing stage which is sensitive to a relevant external property but which is, at the same time, part of the internal mechanism by which the system arrives at its output classification.
The argument for viewing clusters as vehicles of content is based on giving an explanation for generalisation. Some networks fail to generalise, for example by having too many nodes in their hidden layer and so treating each input 'near-individually'. In such cases, even if there happen to be clusters in the network's hidden layer state space (perhaps duplicating clusters in input layer state space), they will not be bearers of content.
The properties tracked by hidden layer clusters can relate in various ways to the properties the network is trained to represent at the output layer. They may be more general than, the same as, more specific than, or orthogonal to the output properties. We saw above that NETtalk divides samples into vowels and consonants on the way to making phonetic classifications at the output layer. Hinton's (1989) network trained to keep track of family relationships between individuals was sensitive, in its internal structure, to features like age and nationality which were not given as training primitives. Elman's (1990) The extent to which connectionist networks satisfy these conditions remains an empirical question. We saw above that there are good reasons to think that at least some do.
Clearly, it is an idealization. In practice some points may fall outside any cluster, and some points in a cluster may not share a relevant property with the majority of their neighbours.
That is to be expected. When real systems approximate to the idealized model, the model can be used to explain the behaviour of the real system.
Since samples activating the same cluster are treated by the hidden layer as similar, a network should be seen as treating samples as different when they activate different clusters in a given layer. Thus, the content ascribed to a cluster should be distinctive of samples in that cluster, as compared with other clusters in the same layer. So the content to be ascribed to make good the foregoing explanation of correct classification of new samples is as follows:
Content of a cluster
Activation of a cluster represents that the presented sample has the property, causally or constitutively relevant to whether the input samples have the properties represented by the output layer, that is common to and distinctive of the correctly classified training samples which produce activation within that cluster. This is not intended to be constitutive of content. Rather, it describes the contents that should be ascribed, but does not attempt to capture the factors in virtue of which clusters have those contents. Thus, it furnishes a useful constraint on any metaphysical theory of content − that, when applied to connectionist systems, the theory should deliver these contents.
Although I have expressed the content of a cluster in the form the presented sample has property P, the cluster has no constituent structure. These are non-conceptual contents (according to one common understanding of that term). English forces us to use a phrase with subject-predicate structure to describe a complete propositional content which, for the system, is realised by a single state without such structure. The system is doing something simple, like feature placing. It can represent properties of the currentlypresent sample but cannot represent properties of objects presented in any other way. For these simple systems, the connectionist network should not be thought of as representing propositional constituents, and its representations do not enter into compositional structures.
Since the properties tracked by a hidden layer must be causally or constitutively relevant to the output task, they must be natural properties. This is a notoriously difficult distinction to draw, but it is motivated by many considerations, and the distinction is needed in many fields; it is not peculiar to connectionist content. Roughly, the idea is that natural properties must figure in natural laws − in this case laws (causal or constitutive) that relate the properties represented at the output layer with those kept track of by the hidden layer. In particular, arbitrary disjunctions of properties will not do. In sum, there is a good reason to attribute content to hidden layer clusters. They also satisfy our desiderata for individuation of vehicles of content (see §2 above): They describe a network's mechanism of operation in a way which abstracts away from individual weight matrices and particular patterns of activation such that the same operations may be found in different networks trained on the same task. Clusters also fulfil the optimistic ambition that representations might help to explain networks' mysterious ability to project correct classificatory practice to novel samples. Taken together, this amounts to a compelling case that clusters are vehicles of content in connectionist systems.
Laakso & Cottrell's Results
The Fodor & Lepore rightly point out that an account of content similarity would be incoherent if there were no such thing as content identity. However, Churchland need not concede that content identity is impossible. In his view:
'A point in activation space acquires a specific semantic content not as a function of its position relative to the constituting axes of that space, but rather as a function of
(1) its spatial position relative to all of the other contentful points within that space;
and (2) Churchland does not say exactly what the relevant function is, but however this framework is filled out networks with the same architecture and weight matrix embedded in the same problem will have the same contents. The objection can only be that identity is rarely realised in practice, not that it is impossible in principle. Churchland accepts this consequence, and therefore accepts the need for a robust notion of concept similarity.
Fodor & Lepore object to the idea that Churchland's content similarity can do the necessary explanatory work. To start with, from the quotation above it looks as if regress threatens. The identity of a particular pattern of activation depends upon its relation to all other contentful points in the same state space, the identity of each of which depends upon their relations to all other points (including the original one), etc. It follows that individual points in two state spaces cannot be compared, and that the only possible comparison is between the overall state spaces. Churchland appears to agree. His measure of content similarity only applies between whole state spaces. It is a standing property.
But we want to allow for occurrent states: when the hidden layer of a network is differently activated on different occasions the network represents different things.
Networks with very similar arrangements of points (possible activations) in state space nevertheless may be in different occurrent states (current activation) from one another.
Relying only on a global measure of content similarity no such distinction can be drawn.
Thus, Churchland's proposal threatens a destructive holism in the individuation of representations.
18 Tiffany (1999) argues that Churchland's theory should avoid this difficulty by presupposing a theory of content. Churchland could then be read as proposing a way of comparing arrangements of contentful points in state space which is parasitic on a pre-existing assignment of content to those points. Tiffany thinks that state space semantics is best seen just as a way of individuating the representational vehicles. While I agree that this debate calls for clarity about the individuation of vehicles of content, I
don't see how a pre-existing theory of content would help, because it can only assign contents once the bearers of those contents have been identified.
18
Fodor (2000) My proposal differs in substantially the same way from O'Brien & Opie (2001) , which is another working-out of state space semantics in the light of Laakso & Cottrell (2000) .
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Notice that, on my proposal, the relevant external features include both properties of the input stimuli which cause activation of a cluster and the property represented by the output cluster which activation of that hidden layer cluster itself causes. Fodor (2000), p. 51 states that they cannot; Fodor & Lepore (1999) , pp. 399-400 suggests that they cannot, especially if the neural similarity is also the basis for content similarity. 24 E.g. Fodor & Pylyshyn (1988) .
Further Virtues of the Proposal
Perhaps the most striking virtue of my account of connectionist representation is the way it models representational development. Theories of content standardly fail to engage with the mechanisms of representational development. They just take the prior development of vehicles of content for granted − they assume a supply of pre-existing entities that can then be put into the internal and mind-world relations needed in order for them to be contentful. 25 This assumption pushes Fodor towards his implausibly strong concept nativism (Fodor 1998 Unlike Tiffany (1999) , as discussed in the previous section. See Rupert (2001) for an argument that the development of new representational primitives must be explained in non-cognitive (ie, non-semantic)
terms. Rupert was responding to Cummins' general argument against representational theories of mind (Cummins 1997) : that the development of new terms in the language of thought can never be explained non-semantically (since appealing to learning is always to explain development in terms of cognitive causes). Rupert suggests that connectionists can answer this challenge by explaining the development of new representations non-cognitively and suggests that regions of state space may be the vehicles of content (although he talks in terms of concepts, rather than non-conceptual representations). My proposal about the vehicles of content in connectionist systems vindicates that suggestion, and shows exactly how the connectionist can meet Cummins' challenge by explaining the development of new vehicles of content nonsemantically.
node, on the basis of the samples that would cause it to be activated. I take it to be almost a reductio of the microfeatural idea that it can ascribe contentful states to an untrained connectionist network which consists simply of some architecture of nodes connected by arbitrary weights. We have no reason at all to think that the states of such a system are contentful. Yet the rationale for thinking of the hidden layer nodes as each encoding some complex feature of all the samples by which it is causally activated applies equally to the untrained network.
The syntax of a classical computer is also built-in. A common concern about modelling cognition on classical computation is that the primitive representations must all be present at the outset. The system can only develop by forming new complex representations out of these pre-existing components. That is a substantial limit. By contrast, connectionism furnishes a model of how new primitive representations develop − by the system learning to 'representationally redescribe', in its hidden layer, the categories given to it as outputs, or the problem in which it is embedded (Karmiloff-Smith 1994).
Once clusters are seen to be vehicles of content, representational redescription can be explained: training gives rise to new representational vehicles (clusters) in hidden layer state space. The approach also shows how representation can arise out of training on a realistic action-based task.
The clustering approach to content and its vehicles in connectionist systems has many other virtues. There is scope here only to list them, without further explanation. It can explain the prototypicality effects exhibited by many trained networks. It has the merit of assigning a role to both inputs to and outputs from a system in ascribing content.
Furthermore, to the extent that the existence and content of clusters idealizes away from the messy details of real systems, it shows why processing described at the semantic level may only satisfy 'soft' constraints.
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In the terminology of Smolensky (1988) , but for a different reason.
Possible Refinements
For the sake of clarity, I have only presented the simplest version of the proposal that the vehicles of content in connectionist systems are clusters or regions of state space. I should mention several possible refinements.
The proposal is naturally extended to recurrent networks, where the vehicles of content are basins or regions of attraction for the dynamic processes which the system undergoes. In that case, the vehicles are not be confined to a particular layer, but will be realised by the entire network, nor are they temporally confined since they are not states but temporally-extended processes. The proposal also applies to networks which develop with Hebbian (or any localist) learning rules and unsupervised learning algorithms. For example, the processing of trained pattern association, auto-association and competitive networks 28 can all be described in terms of clusters. Furthermore, by attaching further networks to a hidden layer in which clustering has occurred, clusters could be taken as input for further kinds of onward processing; a simple example being to map the clusters to individual neurons using a competitive network.
The proposal can be extended to the individuation of clusters of clusters, and thus form the basis for an explanation of representational nesting that does not reply upon compositional structure or explicit knowledge representations. It is also consistent with the analysis of hidden layer state space in terms of principal components. Where some clusters in a layer are the result of the simple combination of others, then those principal components can be viewed as the primitive representational entities. 29 The individuation of clusters can also be modified slightly to take account of the fact that in different regions of hidden layer state space a small change in activation may have more or less effect on the output activation (a modification I call processing topography analysis).
The proposal also gives rise to an empirical prediction (for those readers who think 28 Rolls & Treves (1998) .
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Only simple linear combinations are envisaged, e.g: a, b, and a + b; with all or most of the principal components corresponding to clusters that are actually realised in the state space − not just any reparameterisation will do. that entails that this can't be philosophy: look away now). The microfeatural idea motivates another standard way to investigate the internal workings of a trained network:
knock out one of the hidden layer nodes, and from the pattern of error which results from the lesion, infer the representational role of that node. Since clusters are independent of hidden layer nodes, no analogue of a physical lesion is available to knock out a single cluster. However, something similar is accomplished by removing the effect of a single hidden layer cluster. This is achieved by subtracting from the hidden layer activation vector the component (if any) parallel to that cluster, before activation is passed on to the output layer.
(That effect can be implemented across the board by a suitable transformation of the matrix of weights between hidden layer and output layer.) My prediction is that after such a notional lesion the network will tend to mis-classify samples which have the property that was represented by the cluster that has been artificially removed.
Conclusion
In the debate between philosophers about whether states of connectionist systems are contentful the tacit assumption that the vehicles of content are particular distributed patterns of activation has been left unexamined. If the vehicles of content in connectionist systems are clusters in state space, then it is much easier to see that some connectionist networks operate by processing internal representations.
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